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war or for U.S. involvement. Though
this book is out to sell a policy option,
Pollack’s detailed analyses provide
readers with an excellent basis for understanding the situation in the Middle
East.
PRESTON C. RODRIGUE

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers,
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. New York:
Free Press, 2002. 288pp. $25

This is an extraordinarily timely work,
published when the United States may
be about to conduct large-scale combat
operations in the Middle East. It examines the relationship in a democracy between military and political leadership,
“or more precisely, . . . the tension between two kinds of leadership, civil and
military,” especially in time of war.
Two themes run implicitly throughout
the book. First, war is about more than
purely military considerations (Clausewitzians, rejoice!), and consequently
“war statesmanship . . . focuses at the
apex of government an array of considerations and calculations that even
those one rung down could not fully
fathom.” The resultant differing imperatives at each level explain much of the
inherent tension between civilian and
military leaders over strategy.
Second, the essence of successful wartime leadership depends crucially on
the civilian leadership’s receiving constant, reliable “truth” from its military
commanders. The hierarchical military
structure militates against delivery of
harsh facts or unpleasant news; as per
Winston Churchill, “the whole habit of
mind of a military staff is based on
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subordination of opinion.” Hence the
importance of civilian leaders constantly
asking questions, forcing military leaders
to lay bare their assumptions and explain their reasoning, because nothing
else will force the harsh but vital intellectual debate about whether military
plans actually will achieve the desired
strategic ends. Military expertise is not
decisive here; as David Ben-Gurion
noted, “In military matters, as in all
other matters of substance, experts
knowledgeable in technique don’t decide, even though their advice and
guidance is vital; rather an open mind
and a common sense are essential. And
these qualities are possessed—to a
greater or lesser degree— by any normal man.”
Citing Samuel Huntington’s classic The
Soldier and the State, Cohen describes
the “normal” theory of civil-military
relations, “which holds that the healthiest and most effective form of civilian
control of the military is that which
maximizes professionalism by isolating
soldiers from politics, and giving them
as free a hand as possible in military
matters.” This idea is widely and often
unquestioningly accepted by serving
military officers, reinforced by the apparent lessons of Vietnam, when such
tenets were held to be violated, in contrast with the successes of DESERT
STORM, when the military was ostensibly properly left alone to win the war.
Indeed, for civilians to “ask too many
questions (let alone give orders) about
tactics, particular pieces of hardware,
the design of a campaign, measures of
success, or to press too closely for the
promotion or dismissal of anything
other than the most senior officers is
meddling and interference, which is inappropriate and downright dangerous.”
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Cohen suggests that this is simply
wrong. “The difficulty is that the great
war statesmen do just those improper
things—and, what is more, it is because
they do so that they succeed.” He tests
his thesis using case studies of four
great and successful war leaders—Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau,
Churchill, and Ben-Gurion. Each man
led a different kind of democracy under
extraordinarily difficult circumstances,
“meddled” greatly in military and strategic affairs, was subject to and driven
by the normal pressures and constraints
in his respective state, confronted great
changes in the ways and means of conducting warfare, and had difficult relationships with his senior military
leaders.
In none of these cases was there a fundamental doubt about the subordination of military leaders to civilian
control. However, the acceptance of the
legitimacy of that control coexisted,
and still coexists, with “a deep undercurrent of mutual mistrust,” based on
major differences in outlook, experience, temperament, and culture. Such
differences are exacerbated in wartime,
because unlike other professions such
as law and medicine, a military leader
rarely has actual war-making experience at senior levels, so in a sense he is
no less a “novice in making the great
decisions of war” than his civilian
counterparts. Thus, while “for a politician to dictate military action is almost
always folly,” as Churchill noted, “it is
always right to probe.” That is the common element in these cases—each
leader insisted on close and frequent
contact with his senior military officers,
often to their discomfiture and resentment. Lincoln wrote probing letters to
his generals and “exercised a constant
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oversight of the war effort from beginning to end.” Clemenceau, to the dismay of the French high command,
insisted on frequent firsthand visits to
the front lines to observe the performance of senior military leaders and
review the selection of generals down to
division command. Churchill’s queries
and interventions were legion.
Cohen notes that the United States has,
for the past four decades, essentially
“waged war according to the ‘normal’
theory of civil-military relations,”
whereby politicians “refrain from engaging in the kind of active, harassing,
interventionist probing of the military
leaders about military matters” that
characterized his four great leaders,
contrary to the received (but wrong)
wisdom in the U.S. military. In consequence, “loose assumptions, unasked
questions, and thin analysis” led to catastrophic failure in Vietnam.
More recently, the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, by making the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs the president’s chief military adviser, serves to separate further
the civilian and military leadership
realms. One of the baleful consequences
of “letting the military do their jobs,”
essentially independently of the political leadership once the shooting started,
was the premature end to DESERT
STORM, in which the military was chiefly
responsible for two critical decisions—
General Colin Powell recommended an
early end to the fighting, and General
Norman Schwarzkopf made concessions at Safwan that allowed Saddam
Hussein to survive internal revolts that
might have ended his regime. Missing
in both decisions was clear civilian
control of events. There is little indication of civilian leadership asking the
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necessary probing questions and providing key guidance.
These issues are especially salient now,
as the United States contemplates undertaking military operations that
would have profound strategic and political implications, and when indications of significant differences exist
between civilian and military leaders
concerning strategy and objectives, be it
against terrorism or militant Islam.
Eliot Cohen is professor of strategic
studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. A prolific author on strategy, he
has served on the Office of the Secretary
of Defense policy planning staff and is
currently a member of the Defense Policy Board, advising the secretary of defense. Supreme Command is a must read
for the highest civilian and military
leadership and should also rank high on
military professional reading lists.
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy

Bacevich, Andrew J., and Eliot A. Cohen, eds.
War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global
Age. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2001.
223pp. $22.50

During the 1999 Nato-U.S. war against
Serbia over Kosovo, an unprecedented
number of strategic and defense thinkers published their opinions on what
became known as Operation ALLIED
FORCE. Most thought and comment at
the time was extremely critical of the
Clinton administration’s efforts to formulate and execute the operation.
Critics bemoaned a warfighting policy
that appeared pointed in the direction
of a new Vietnam, focusing on gradual
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escalation of air strikes without the
threat of ground forces. In the end, the
Nato coalition forces appeared victorious but weighted with the indefinite
mission of peacekeeping in that troubled and violent province. The leader of
the Serbian effort, Slobodan Milosevic,
ended up on trial for war crimes at the
Hague. The leader of the Nato-U.S.
armed forces, General Wesley Clarke,
left his post shortly after the victory under circumstances that looked at the
time like a relief for cause. In late summer 2002, Nato soldiers continued their
frustrating mission of keeping ethnically divided Kosovars from killing each
other—welcome to “Victory,” post–
Cold War style. While such behavior
and commentary seem unusual, the real
issue is this: does the 1999 Kosovo
“war” provide a signpost for future
conflicts in the early twenty-first century, or is that conflict an aberration
best relegated to discussions among
armchair warriors comfortably fortified
with vintage brandy?
In their book War over Kosovo, Bacevich, Cohen, and their contributors
make compelling arguments that the
Kosovo War is a signpost, a cautionary
tale of the extent and limits of post–
Cold War superpower politics. Besides
the articles by the editors, the contributions are by William Arkin, James
Kurth, Anatol Lieven, Alberto Coll, and
Michael Vickers.
Readers should note well that this is a
book with an attitude. Its articles, uniformly excellent and insightful, accept,
even embrace, controversy. Given the
nature of the war, such a position for
the book should seem normal.
William Arkin’s lead article, summarizing the history of the conflict, should
become the standard for historians and
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